UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-3-2009

Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. of
County Comm'rs Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
35730

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Comm'rs Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 35730" (2009). Idaho Supreme
Court Records & Briefs. 158.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/158

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC
Appellant,
VS.
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ELMER R.
CURRIE: RICHARD A. PIAZZA, AND W.

I

II

1.

Supreme Court No. 35730

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Respondents.
and
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, A non-profit unincorporated
Association; NORBERT and BEVERLY
TWILLMANN, husband and wife, SUSAN
MELKA; BILL and SYLVIA LAMPARD,
husband and wife; DAVID and BAlZBARA
WARDSWORTH, husband and wife; and
HEATHER BOWLBY,

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
for Kootenai County
Honorable JOHN PATRICK LUSTER, District Judge
Robert H. Freilich
FREILICH & POPOWITZ LLP
10580 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 56
Los Angeles. CA 90024
(3 10) 415-8 134 Telephone
(3 10) 475-3024 Facsimile

---

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ISSUES AND FACTS RAISED BY RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS FAIL TO
OVERCOME TIiE OPENING BRIEF'S COMPELLING ARGUMENTS .................................. 7
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS PROVIDE AMPLE SUPPORT JUSTIFYING
I1.
RATHER THAN REPUDIATING THE FACT THAT THE BOARD'S FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS DENYNG THE ICHD QUASI-JUDICIAL APPLICATION WERE
10
ARBITRARY. CAPRICIOUS AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.....................................
The Coinprehensive Plan Argument.........................................................................10
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

Water Service................................................................................................................14

Wastewater Treatment ................................................................................................ 15
Wetlands .................................................................................................................
16
Runoff and Erosion ........................................................................................................17
Transportation .............................................................................................................. 18
Emergency Services .......................................................................................................20
1-1. Respondent Disregards All Expert Testimony in Favor of Public Comment and Cannot
Point to a Single Public Agency Supportive of its Conclusory Findings.........................21
I11. THE RESPONDENT BOCC IS BARRED BY THE QUASI-ESTOPPEL BRANCH OF
THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE FROM VIOLATING ITS POSTARBITRATION AGREEMENT WITH APPELLANT, KHD ........................................ 23
IV . ADMINISTRATIVE FINALITY, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA
PREVENT RESPONDENT FROM TAKING A NEW BITE OF THE APPLE IN THE
SECOND HEARING.........................................................................................................30
Issue Preclusion ............................................................................................................31
A.
Claiin Preclusion ............................................................................................................32
B.
V.
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO KFlD IS CLEARLY APPROPRIATE IN
THIS INSTANCE, WHERE RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT A REASONABLE
BASIS IN FACT OR IN LAW ..........................................................................................
33
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................
35

TABLE OF AUTIIORITIES
IdahoCases
Allen v. Reynolds. 145 Idaho 807; 186 P.2d 663 (2008)...............................................................24
Andrus v. Nicholson. 145 Idaho 774; 186 P.3d 630 (2008) ............................................

31. 32. 35

Atwood v. Smith. 143 Idaho 110; 138 P.3d 3 10 (2006) ....................................................
23. 24. 27
Averitt v. City of Coeur dillene. 100 Idaho 751; 605 P.2d 515 (1980)........................................
33
BirdwoodSubdivision HOA. Znc. v. Bulotti Const.. Znc., 145 Idaho 17; 175 P.3d 179 (2007).....24
Blackburn v. Olson, 69 Idaho 428; 207 P.2d 1160 (1949) ........................................................... 30
Bogner v. State Dep't ofRevenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854; 693 P.2d 1056 (1984) ................33
C & G. Inc . v. Canyon Highway District No . 4, 139 Idaho 140; 75 P.3d 194 (2003) 23,24,26, 27
C Systems. Znc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559; 181 P.3d 485 (2008) ..................................................
35
Campbellv. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640; 115 P.3d 731 (2005) ....................................................24, 27
Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd o f Comm 'vs, 125 Idaho 115 (1994) .....................................

34

Christiansen v. City ofPocatello, 142 Idaho 132; 124 P . 3d 1008 (2005) .......................23. 24, 26
Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433; 942 P.2d 557 (1997) ........................................20
Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407 (1980) .................
..........34
.
Cowan v. Bd . of Comm 'us of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501 (2006) .......................................

34

Curtis v. M H . King Co., 142 Idaho 383; 128 P.3d 920 (2005) .............................................. 21, 23
D.A.R.. Znc. v. Shefir, 134 Idaho 141; 997 P.2d 602 (2000) .......................................................30
Diamond v. Farmers Group. Inc., 119 Idaho 146; 804 P.2d 3 19 (1990) ..................................

32

Dove1 v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59; 83 1 P.2d 527 (1992)..................................................................
10
Farmers Nut? Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63; 878 P.2d 762 (1994) .............................................32
Harrell v. City oflewiston, 95 Idaho 243; 506 P.2d 741 (1973) .................................................26
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92; 57 P.3d 803 (2002) .........................................................30, 32
3

I$omestead Farms. Inc . v. Board of County Comm'rs of Teton County. 141 Idaho 855; 119 P.3d
630 (2005) .................................................................................................................................
10
Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. City of Boise. 134 Idaho 651; 8 P.3d 646 (2000) ........,.20
Idaho State Bar v. Everard. 142 Idaho 109. 124 P.3d 985 (2005) ...............................................35
In Re Estate of Elliott. 141 Idaho 177; 108 P.3d 324 (2005)................................................. 24. 28
In Re PaciJic National Life Assurance Company. 70 Idaho 98; 212 P.2d 379 (1949) .................11
J&JContractors v. State by Idaho Transportation Board. 118 Idaho 535; 792 P.2d 1383 (1990)
...................................................................................................................................................
35
Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549; 208 P . 241 (1922) ...........................32. 35
Knight v. New Mexico Department of Insurance. 124 Idaho 645; 862 P.2d 337 (Id. App . 1993) 36
Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofSun Valley. 144 Idaho 584; 166 P.3d 374 (2007) ................. 11
Madsen v. Idaho Department of Transportation. 115 Idaho 1132; 722 P.2d 1226 (1989) ..........30
Magic Valley Radiology. P A . v. Kolouch. 123 Idaho 434; 849 P.2d 107 (1993) ........................32
Marcia T. Turner. LLC v. City of Twin Falls. 144 Idaho 203; 159 P.3d 840 (2007) ................... 34
Paul v. Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine. 134 Idaho 838;
11 P.3d 34 (2000) ...................................................................................................................... 11
Pence v. Idaho State Horse Racing Comm'n. 109 Idaho 112; 707 P.2d 1067 (Idaho App . 1985)
............................................................................................................................................. 30. 33
Rincover v. State. Dep't of Fin.. Secs. Bureau. 132 Idaho 547; 976 P.2d 473 (1999) ............ 33. 35
Riverside Development Company v. Vandenberg. 137 Idaho 382; 48 P.3d 1271 (2002)............. 11
Rodriguez v. Dep't of Corr., 136 Idaho 90; 29 P.3d 401 (2001) ............................................ 30. 3 1
Rosebud Enterprises. Inc . v. Idaho Public Utilities ~ o k m ' n 128
. Idaho 609; 917 P.2d 766 (1996)
...................................................................................................................................................
25
Sagewillow. Inc . v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831; 70 P.3d 669 (2003) .......... 35
Schiewe v. Farwell. 125 Idaho 70; 867 P.2d 920 (1992) ..............................................................
27

Sorensen v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754; 118 P.3d 86 (2005) .. 24
The Highlands. Inc . v. Hosac. 130 Idaho 67; 936 P.2d 1309 (1997)............................................27
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce. Inc.. 137 Idaho 352; 48 P.3d 1241 (2002) .................................... 27
Ticor Title Colnpany v. Stanion. 144 Idaho 119; 157 P.3d 613 (2007) ..................................... ... 30
Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. Corp. v . Hamill, 103 Idaho 19; 644 P.2d 341 (1982) ..........23
Uhl v. Ballard Medical Products. Inc.. 138 Idaho 653;'67 P.3d 1265 (2003) ........................21. 23
Urrutia v. Blaine County. 134 Idaho 353; 2 P.3d 738 (2000) ................................................12. 13
W K P . v. U S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 535 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D. Idaho, 2007) ....................... 17
Washington Water Power Company v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n. 101 Idaho 567; 617 P.2d
1242 (1980) ............................................................................................................................ 26
WoodJield v. Board of Professional Discipline ofIdaho State Board of Medicine. 127 Idaho 738;
11
905 P.2d 1047 (1995)...............................................................................................................
Wynn v. Campbell. 145 Idaho 727; 184 P.3d 852 (2008) ...........................................................

24

Federal Cases

Western Watershed Project v. Kraayenbrink. 538 F.Supp.2d 1308 (D. Idaho. 2008) .....................11
Western Watershed Project v. Majetko. 468 F.3d 1099 (9" Cir.. Idaho. 2006) ............................

12

Other State Cases

Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v.County of Sun Luis Obispo. 84 C a l . ~ ~ ~ .221;
4 " ' 100
Cal.Rptr.2d 740 (2000) .................................................................................................................26
Statutes

LC. $12-1 17(1) (2004) ..................................................................................................................
33
I.C. $67-5279(3)(d)..................................................................................................................

10

29
I.C. $67-6519(4)(c) .......................................................................................................................
19
I.C. $67-6535 ...............................................................................................................................

Treatises
David L. Callies, Robert H. Freilich and Thomas E. Roberts, Cases and Materials on Land Use,
Development Agreements, 168-182 (5thed. West, 2008)............................
................ 26
Restatement (Second) of Judgments $24 (1982) ..................................................................32

ISSUES AND FACTS RAISED BY RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS FAIL TO
OVERCOME THE OPENING BRIEF'S COMPELLING ARGUMENTS.
The County ("Respondent) and Neighbors ' for Responsible Growth ("Intervenor")
misrepresent the facts and misapprehend the law in a further arbitrary and capricious attempt to
justify the Board of County Commissioners ("BOCC") bowing to political pressure and refusing
to fulfill its legal obligations as a quasi-judicial body by effectively legislatively rezoning the
land in question.
First, at the second hearing the BOCC unreasonably and unethically ignored the post
mediation agreement reached by the parties while the first appeal was pending to limit the issues
on remand to the Board, which Respondents admit that KHD fully satisfied (Respondent's Brief
at p. 26). Respondents only rely on the District Court's legal finding that estoppel didn't applya purely legal question for this court, and they could introduce wholly new issues at the second
hearing. The law on these issues -fully established in Idaho and nationally - is clear. KirkHughes Development, LLC, under these circumstances was entitled to have its application for a
planned unit development ("PUD") approved based on the satisfaction of the post-mediation
terms Indeed, neither Respondent nor Intervenor effectively contradict the established law
based on quasi-estoppel and administrative res judicata.
Second, the facts as to the County's arbitrary and capricious co~lductare quite startling.
Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC ("KHD") sought to build a private resort community of 475
dwelling units, with extraordinary set asides for open space and preservation of all wetlands, on
land zoned by Respondent for an allowable as of right density of 1,000 dwelling units. KHD
submitted an application for a quasi-judicial administrative planned unit development ("PUD"),

not a legislative rezoning.

ICHD's plans met all planning and engineer infrastructure

requirements for fire and roads, water and sewer, environmental preservation and open space, as
found in the County Planning Staff Report (Record on Second Appeal, 2065-2301). The County
Hearing Examiner held extensive public hearings, and found that KHD's plan "is compatible
with the goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan" and recommended approval, subject to
certain standard conditions, which KHD agreed to undertake. (March 2, 2006 Hearing Examiner
Report, Record on First Appeal, 1655-57)
At the first BOCC hearing, citizen objections were raised that no new growth should be
permitted at all on KHD's land (Transcript of July 13, 2006 Proceedings, Record on First
Appeal, Vol. 2). Chairman Currie, without BOCC authority or notice to KHD, conducted an
illegal ex parte amateur "traffic study" by twice driving I-lighway 97 (Transcript of July 27,2006
Proceedings, Record on First Appeal, 0394-96), which "study" he thereafter convinced the entire
BOCC to adopt in lieu of the Idaho Transportation Department's ("ITD) study, Plamling Staff,
the Hearing Examiner and KHD's traffic experts that KHD's development had adequate capacity
on Highway 97 and met all traffic safety requirements. KHD had actually agreed in the postmediation agreement to construct a bridge over Highway 97, which further reduced the demand
on the highway created by the KHD development. Indeed, ignoring the findings of the Hearing
Examiner based on expert testimony and the written findings of the ITD, the BOCC denial
arbitrarily and capriciously found:
"The position of ITD was not supported by the public testimony or the personal
experiences of the BOCC. As a body the BOCC has almost one-hundred and fifty
years of experience living in Kootenai County. The members have, over the
years, traveled Highway 97 for personal as well as professional reason [sic] both
for the County and in private employment. It has been their personal experience
that Highway 97 in its present state is not conducive to this increased level of
development." (ROA, First Appeal, 1966).

Third, the BOCC, as a matter of law, wrongfully concluded that the "single most relevant
question is whether this project is appropriate for the location," completely ignoring the fact that
their legislative rezoning question was answered in the affirmative when the property was
previously zoned as consistent and compatible with the comprehensive plan and properly located
for approximately 1,000 dwellings - more than double what KHD was seelcing to build.
KHD brought the matter before the District Court. During the appeal, the parties entered
into a Post-Mediation Agreement wherein the Board and ICHD identified the specific actions that
ICHD could talce to obtain a permiUapprova1 of the PUD, and expedited the hearing process so
that KHD could comply with the requirements and move forward.
KHD fulfilled all of its obligations under the Post-Mediation Agreement and filed with
the County, a slightly revised application with the few modifications required to meet the terms
of the Post-Mediation Agreement, together with a subdivisioil plat application, in anticipation of
the agreed upon expedited hearing process. The County Planning Staff, which was intimately
involved in the process, recommended approval with the standard conditions (County Planning
Staff Report, Record on Appeal, 2065-2301).
The BOCC, instead of hearing the issues raised under the Post-Mediation Agreement,
appears from the record of intervenor objections to all development on the KHD property, to
have gone totally out of its way to find any excuse to deny KHD approval, concluding that while
the KHD application did satisfy the Goals of the County's Comprehensive Plan that were at issue
under the Agreement - but then added five new Goals of incompatibility, that the first Board and
Hearing Examiner findings did not raise and to which they had no objections.

11.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS PROVIDE AMPLE SUPPORT JUSTIFYING
RATHER THAN REPUDIATING THE FACT THAT THE BOARD'S FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS DENYING THE KHD QUASI-JUDICIAL APPLICATION
WERE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
A. The Comprehensive Plan Argument.

Appellant is frankly puzzled as to how Respondent can claim the BOCC's finding the application
to be incompatible with the County' comprehensive plan was not arbitrary, capricious and an
abuse of discretion. For the District Court to uphold the BOCC's decision under the clearly
erroneous standard, it must still conclude that the record contains some reliable, probative and
substantial evidence in support of the Board's position. See, I.C. $67-5279(3)(d): (3)"....the
Court shall affirm the agency action...unless the 'Court finds that the agency's findings,
inferences, conclusions or decisions are (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole"

Dove1 v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 831 P.2d 527 (1992). Where such lack of

substantial evidence occurs, erroneous decisions of the administrative agency will be corrected
on appeal. Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, 141
Idaho 855,119 P.3d 630 (2005).
On page 12 of its brief, Respondent identifies seven (7) goals listed in the coinprehensive
plan - Goals 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 23 and 24

-

that the application allegedly did not meet. Vet

mysteriously, the BOCC, on August 24, 2006, did not find that KHD was incompatible with
Goals 4,9, 17, 23 & 24. (Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 26-27) and indeed the Hearing Officer
found and concluded that the KHD application met all of the Comprehensive Plan Goals (March
2,2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1655-56).
The BOCC failed to give proper consideration to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact,
conclusions and recommendations. Where the Administrative Agency's findings disagree with

those of the hearingpanel, the court will scrutinize the agency's findings more critically. Paul v.

Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine, 134 Idaho 838, 11 P. 3d
34 (2000). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, in reviewing agency action, the Court is
required to engage in a thorough probing in depth review. Western Watershed Project v.

Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Idaho, 2008).
Where the evidence on appeal is without substantial and reasonable conflict, it becomes a
question of law for the Supreme Court as to whether the evidence will support the conclusioi~
reached by the Board. In Re PaciJic National Life Assurance Company, 70 Idaho 98, 212 P.2d
379 (1949), and the Court uses "fiee review." Riverside Development Company v. Vandenberg,
137 Idaho 382,48 P.3d 1271 (2002). In a recent land use approval case, even involving rezoning
of the land, this Court held that where there is a mistaken interpretation of fact in denying the
zoning on even one point, no less than the total absence of substantial evidence for all of its
conclusions as in this case, the City erred. Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofSun Valley, 144
Idaho 584,590, 166 P.3d 374 (2007).
Although the district court in this case did not take into account the Hearing Examiner's findings,
conclusio~lsand recommendations, the appellate court will scrutinize the agency's factual
findings more critically if they contradict the Hearing Examiner's conclusions, than if they
accord with the Hearing Examiner's findings. Wood$eld v. Board ofProfessiona1 Discipline oj

Idaho State Board ofMedicine, 127 Idaho 738; 905 P.2d 1047 (1995).
The only two Goals, 7 & 14, raised at the first hearing were related to hazardous areas
and traffic, which the post-mediation agreement specifically addressed and all conditions relating
to those two Goals were completely satisfied. KHD abated all traffic congestion by building the

bridge over Highway 97 and mitigated all wetlands and hillside areas. See the County Planning
Staff Report of August 23, 2007 finding that all conditions had been satisfied and the KHD
development application was completely compatible with all Comprehensive Goals (Record on
Second Appeal, 2065-2301). As the post-mediation application was nothing inore than a slightly
modified version of the original application to address the limited two Goal issues agreed upon
in the Post-Mediation Agreement, the only rational conclusion is that the Respondent's findings
and conclusions based on five new goals it found to be in compliance in the first hearing are
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. Where an agency changes its course by
rescinding its prior action, it is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond
that which is required in the first place. Western Watershed Project v. Majetko, 468 F. 3d 1099
(9'h Cir., Idaho, 2006),
Respondent merely stretches its already weak position by looking to Uvvutia v. Blaine
County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000) for justification of the BOCC's improper reliance on

the comprehensive plan to deny KHD's application, but Urrutia does not support Respondent's
position. This Court's position in Urrutia, and throughout Idaho case law, supports ICHD's
position:
"[A] comprehensive plan and a zoning ordinance are distinct concepts serving
different purposes. A comprehensive plan reflects the "desirable goals and
objectives, or desirable future situations" for the land within a jurisdiction. I.C.
567-6508. This Court has held that a comprehensive plan does not operate as
legally controlling zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the
governmental agencies responsible for making zoning decisions. [citations
omitted]. The Board may, therefore, refer to the coinprehensive plan as a general
guide in instances involving zoning decisions such as revising or adopting a
zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, by contrast, reflects the permitted uses
allowed for various parcels within the jurisdiction. See I.C. 567-651 1." Urrutia,
134 Idaho at 357-58; 2 P.3d at 742-43 (Emphasis added).

In other words, where the BOCC is deciding to revise or adopt a zoning ordinance, the
comprehensive plan should serve as its guide. We can assume that the BOCC loolced to
the comprehensive plan as a guide when it zoned the land for approximately 1,000
dwellings as a use by right. In the present instance, there was no request to revise or
adopt a zoning ordinance, and there has never been any question but that KHD's
application for 475 dwellings falls well within the density and size limitations of the
zoning ordinance
In Urrutia, this Court was faced with strikingly similar facts.

There, the

appellants were denied a permit to build a subdivision that comported with the zoning
ordinance because the development supposedly did not strictly comply with all of the
provisions of the comprehensive plan. There the court ruled that:
"It is to be expected that the land to be subdivided may not agree with all
provisions in the comprehensive plan, but a more specific analysis,
resulting in denial of a subdivision application based solely on noncompliance with the comprehensive plan elevates the plan to the level of
legally controlling zoning law. Such a result affords the Board unbounded
discretion in examining a subdivision application and allows the Board to
effectively re-zone land based on the general language in the
comprehensive plan. As indicated above, the comprehensive plan is
intended merely as a guideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning
decisions. Those zoning decisions have already been made in this
instance, and land subdivided into twenty-acre lots and used for single
family residences is specifically permitted in this agricultural area. Thus,
we agree with the district judge that the Board erred in relying completely
on the comprehensive pl an..." Urrutia at 358-359. (Emphasis added.)
As in Urrutia, KHD was entitled to rely on the legally controlling zoning law, which
permitted approximately twice as many dwellings as KHD was seeking to build. When
the BOCC found KHD's applications to be incompatible with the surrounding
neighborhood, it effectively re-zoned the property, purportedly using the general policies

set forth in the comprehensive plan (with which in fact the KHD development application
complied and was compatible) as the overt basis for denying KHD's application.
It is entirely inappropriate for the BOCC to revisit the question of whether
development that comports with the applicable zoning should be allowed, yet that is
exactly what Respondent did here, despite clear Idaho law to the contrary.
B. Water Service.
On page 16 of its brief, Respondent concedes that KHD planned to build water storage
units to be used if the project could not draw down its allotted water from Lake Coeur d'Alene
and from five (5) wells on the property, yet argues that the BOCC was "not satisfied that ICHD
had made adequate plans for water service" in low water years.
Pointedly, the Hearing Officer found that "the services and facilities (available water
service) necessary to serve the development are feasible, available and any adverse impact will
be adequately mitigated". (March 2, 2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal,
1655-1656). Similarly, the County Planning Staff found that the plans for water service were
fully adequate. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second Appeal, 2065-2301).
Ironically, neither the BOCC during the initial application process, nor during the mediation, nor
the terms of the Post-Mediation Agreement, where the BOCC had ample opportunity to raise
such a concern, address this issue.
Only after the fact, after I(HD has fulfilled its obligations under the Agreement, does this
issue arise. Respondent provides no basis for this conclusion - no specific findings, no expert
testimony to contradict the Hearing Examiner, the Planning Staff or the Idaho Department of
Water Resources ("IDWR) which issued water permits -just undocumented lay opinions and

statements made by members of the public. Indeed, Respondents concede that KHD had
obtained permits from the IDWR that fully met the water requirements of the project on a
permanent basis (Administrative Record, p. 2208-10, 3729-35) (Respondent's Brief, p. 16).
Moreover, KHD satisfied the IDWR requirements during any droppage of the Spolcane River by
requiring that KHD build storage facilities to meet any shortfall (Administrative Record, 220810,3729-35).
C. Wastewater Treatment
Similarly with regard to wastewater treatment, Respondent concedes that ISHD's
wastewater treatment facility was acceptable to the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
(IDEQ) (Respondent's Brief at p.17), which found it to be adequate and safe, yet argues that its
rejection of the project was appropriate because the BOCC concluded, without a shred of
evidence to support it, that a hypothetical failure of the system could lead to effluent flowing to
neighboring properties. Yet this very same system was used, with County approval, at another
development of far greater density, on a permanent basis at the nearby Gozzer Ranch and Lake
Club.
Pointedly, the Hearing Officer found that "the services and facilities (including waste
water treatment) necessary to serve the development are feasible, available and any adverse
impact will be adequately mitigated". (March 2, 2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on
First Appeal, 1655-1656). Similarly, the County Planning Staff found that the plans for
wastewater treatment were fully adequate. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second
Appeal, 2065-230).

Again, this was not an issue for the Hearing Officer or the BOCC during the initial
application process or the mediation, and the Post-Mediation Agreement, where the BOCC had
ample opportunity to raise such a concern, does not address it. Only after the fact, after ICHD
has fulfilled its obligations under the Agreement, does this issue arise. Respondent provides no
basis for this conclusion - no specific findings, no expert testi~nony- just the apparent lay
opinion of the BOCC and statements made by members of the public.

D. Wetlands
Respondent's arguments pertaining to wetlands are simply more of the same - inaccurate.
KHD proposed turning the 23 acres of wetlands presently on the property into 30 acres of
wetlands. The Agreement called for, and KHD agreed, that "[alny disturbance of wetlands shall
be in compliance with federal, state and local regulations and permitting, including those of the
United States Army Corp of Engineers."
Tom Duebendorfer, a professional wetlands scientist, prepared a revised Wetlands Impact
Analysis and Proposed Conceptual Wetlands Mitigation report, setting forth how KHD would
mitigate hydrologic protection areas (HPAs) beginning with the mitigation for HPA
encroachments, including HPAs on creeks, HPAs on wetlands and HPAs in areas adjacent to
proposed wetland fills.
Respondent alleges in its brief at pages 18-19, for the first time, that the ICHD failed to
comply with subsection 9-15-7(C)(2) of the zoning ordinance.

Specifically, Respondent

emphasizes that proposed roads and utilities are to be kept to a miniinum, and that the Board may
require an easement. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 18-19). This alleged issue was never raised by the
Hearing Examiner, by Planning Staff or by the BOCC at any time. Moreover, not only is this the

first time this issue has been raised, but Respondent provides not a scintilla of evidence to
support its contention. This is just another example of the County coming up, after the fact, with
"findings" to support its pre-conceived decision to ltill this project, and of the arbitrary and
capricious nature of the County's actions in this instance. Respondent's argument that KHD
failed to adequately mitigate potential damage to wetlands is sheer hyperbole.
Instead, the BOCC relied on "public testimony that man-made wetlands do not perform
as well as natural wetlands" (Respondent's Brief, page 19). Again, no evidence but statements
of lay opinion were provided and the scientific evidence was ignored. See W W.P. v. US. Fish

and Wildlife Service, 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Idaho, 2007) (a presumption of agency expertise
may be rebutted if there is no reasoned scientific expertise behind its decision).

E.

Runoff and Erosion
Respondent again relies on the comprehensive plan, which identifies certain soil types as

susceptible to slippage, to argue that the property is inappropriate for development, but ignores
the fact that the County previously zoned the property for approximately 1,000 dwelli~lgunits,
which would create twice the slippage on a conventional subdivision as of right. Indeed, the
Planning Staff Report of August 23,2007 found:
" Based on zoning designations, the maximum potential number of residential
lots for this site is approximately 1050 lots.. .It should be noted that.. .the proposal
has reduced the maximum potential density to less than half of the potentially
allowable dwelling units." (County Planning Staff Report, Record on second
Appeal, 2065-2301)

The Respondent can't have it both ways. It cannot zone a property for this level of
development, and then deny the application based on notion that the land is unsuited to building
a development with half as many units! The Hearing Officer found that there was no prospect of

runoff and erosion from the property because the plans had sophisticated stormwater
management design and management. (March 2, 2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on
First Appeal, 1655-1656). Similarly, the County Planning Staff found that the plans for
stormwater management were fully adequate. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second
Appeal, 2065-2301).
Respondent's answer is to cling to the materials submitted by William Boyd, a local
attorney. What is left unstated is that Mr. Boyd's materials are 12 years old, and were prepared
in opposition to a zoning change concerning an application to do mining on acreage not included
in KHD's 578 acres! This may be the most irrelevant document the BOCC relied on and is
perhaps the most prominent evidence of why the BOCC's actions must be deemed arbitrary and
capricious and an abuse of discretion.

P.

Transportation

In arguing the transportation issues raised by KHD, the Respondent focuses on the phrases and
parts it wants, and simply misstates the facts in order to support its decision. Contrary to
Respondent's statement at page 21 of its brief, the East Side Highway District (ESHD) did not
oppose the project, it merely outlined several suggestions and criteria that need to be met - many
of which KUD has already met or initiated. With regard to the description of the terrain as
"mountainous" versus "rolling," which Respondent gives so much weight, ESI-ID in its own
letter to the Kootenai County Planning Department, states the "terrain is rolling to mountainous."
(August 14,2007 EDHD letter, ROA pp. 2509-2512).
As noted in Respondent's Brief, the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) concurred
with the methodology and findings of the Transpo study and with the proposed overpass over

Highway 97, to be build by ICHD, and concluded that Highway 97 would not reach 80% of
capacity until 2022. Despite this, the Respondent suggests that the existence of construction
traffic could be "significant," implying that no one should ever build anything because there
might temporarily be trucks on the highway as a result.
Perhaps the most disturbing example of the arbitrary and capricious nature of the process
in this instance is the BOCC's reliance on amateur traffic studies of Highway 97. Although the
BOCC aclcnowledged that the issues surrounding Highway 97 fall under the jurisdiction of the
ITD, it nevertheless completely disregards ITD's professional assessment of the highway's
capacity, relying instead, upon Chairman Currie's novice survey. Even though Mr. Currie took
his drive of Highway 97 in 2006, he brought it before the Board in December 2007, stating:
"Uh, I have major concerns with Highway 97. Uh uh and what happens to 97 in
the future. Right now there is uh (inaudible) that approximately if everybody
from the east side of the Lake comes in today and wants a building permit we
would have to issue in the neighborhood of four thousand building permits. And
that road just can't handle it. So, what do we tell those people down the line uh
when the road does not handle it that could have gotten a building permit today"
(Exhibit 13, pg. 8, ins. 3-10; A.R. 3928:3-10)
Commissioner Piazza made a similar statement:
"The highway is another issue that there are 1500 homes out there right now the
possibility of another 4500 just with the existing parcels." (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 415, 11
9-15).
What is the legal basis for a Coininissioner making a decision concerning an application
currently before the Board based on the hypothetical of what other members of the public might
or might not choose to do months or years "down the line?!" This is a gross violation of I.C.
567-6535, which sets forth in pertinent part:
"(c) It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made pursuant to this chapter
should be founded upon sound reason and practical application of recognized
principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts of the state are directed

to consider the proceedings as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures
and resultant decisions in light of practical considerations with an emphasis on
fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making."
Moreover, it is a clear violation of KHD's due process rights. A quasi-judicial officer must
confine his decision to the record produced at the public hearing. Idaho Iiistoric Preservation

Council v. City of Boise, 134 Idaho 651; 8 P.3d 646 (2000). In Comer v. Counly of Twin Falls,
130 Idaho 433; 942 P.2d 557 (1997), the Twin Falls Board of Commissioners violated the
Appellant's due process rights when they viewed the property without giving notice and without
giving the parties the opportunity to be present. In the instant case, Mr. Currie, Chairman of the
BOCC, chose to do an amateur traffic study on his own and without notice KI-ID. He then used
his results to testify against the project, to convince his fellow Board Members to vote against
the project and to himself vote against the project. This Court in Comer, found:
"The opportunity to be present at a view provides opposing parties the
opportunity to rebut the facts derived from the'visit that may come to bear on the
ultimate decision and create an appearance of bias. A view of the subject
property without notice to the interested parties by a Board . . . has been held a
violation of due process." Comer, 134 Idaho at 438; 8 P.3d at 562.
There is no evidence that four thousand permit applications waiting to be brought before the
Board. There is no basis in law or fairness for a County to discriminate against KHD by
requiring it to step aside in order to permit some mythical applicants to come forward.
G.

Emergency Services

Respondent sets forth on page 22 of its brief that Emergency Medical Services (EMS) is
provided by the Coeur d'Alene Fire Department. Respondent again misstates the facts. As was
stated in letters to the Icootenai Planning Department, the East Side Fire Protection District
("ESFD") is increasing its services to include first responder capabilities, so the issue of a 20-

minute drive is both irrelevant and moot (March 29, 2007 ESFD Memo, ROA p. 2505). As
conceded by Respondent (Respondent's Brief at p. 22):
"In an effort to mitigate these concerns, ESFD required KHD to convey land for a
fire station, pay for the construction of the station, and build a helipad suitable for
air ambulance service, conditions which were agreeable to KHD. (Agency
Record, 2450,251 I)."
All of these conditions were agreed to, despite the great cost involved, by KHD.

H.
Respondent Disregards All Expert Testimony in Favor of Public Comment and
Cannot Point to a Single Public Agency Supportive of its Conclusory Findings.
The Court is obligated to overrule the "factual" findings ofthe BOCC when, as here, they
are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. Uhl v. Ballard Medical Products, Inc.,
138 Idaho 653, 657; 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003); Curtis v. M.H. King Co., 142 Idaho 383; 128
P.3d 920,922 (2005).
The facts throughout this process have shown the BOCC to have had a troubling habit of
completely disregarding the experts - those working for the State of Idaho and for Kootenai
County, as well as those retained by KHD - and instead deferring to, and relying exclusively on,
the opinioiis of its members and on statements by the public. Again and again, Respondent
points out that the BOCC is relying on "public testimony." While conceding that KHD was
relying on the support of all the state agencies, the Hearing Examiner and the County Planning
Staff, the Respondent also concedes that despite the County's own lack of expert testimony or
documentation, KHD produced substantial and even voluminous expert and scientific evidence,
concedi~lg:
"ICHD certainly provided voluminous evidence in support of the Chateau
application, including plans, studies and other documents prepared by engineers
and other design professionals." (Respondent's Brief, p. 15)

Respondent further alleges at page 15-16 that public testimony and comments received by public
agencies raised concerns. Yet in neither of their briefs can Respondent or Intervenor cite to a
single state, county or local public agency that supports the County's position on any point.
At the same time Respondent concedes that all state agencies, ITD, IDWR and IDEQ have
approved of KIiD's plans.
The only local agencies Respondent identifies as purportedly opposing the prqject are
the East Side Highway District ("ESHD) and the East Side Fire Protection District ("ESFD),
but even there, Respondent's contention is unsupportable. A review of the ESHD letter of
August 14, 2007 (A.R. 2509-2512) clearly evidences no such opposition, merely an outline of
several suggestions and criteria to be met - all of which KHD has already met or initiated in both
of its applications.
A review of the ESFD meinorandurn of March 29, 2007 (A.R. 2505-2506) sets forth that

that KHD has "already paid taxes for sufficient stations and vehicles to provide for necessary
emergency vehicles" (emphasis added) and upon KHD (1) meeting all relevant international fire
codes and (2) deeding one acre of land to ESFD, ESFD "will have no life-safety related
objections to approval of the PUD." (A.R., 2505-2506) (Emphasis added).
Similarly, the ESFD memorandum of August 16, 2007 (A.R. 2504) sets forth that ICHD
will (1) comply with all relevant international fire codes; (2) deed one acre of land to ESFD for a
fire station; and (3) pay to build a fire station. It goes on to say: "When the above requirements
are satisfied, ESFD will have no life-safety related objections to approval of the PUD." (A.R.,
2504) (Emphasis added).
Quasi-judicial determinations must be based upon competent evidence and acceptable
scientific documentation, not unsupported statements of possible future events, or on some

layperson's opinion. The Court is obligated to overrule the "factual" findings of the BOCC
when, as here, they are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. Uhl v. Ballard
Medical Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657; 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003); Curtis v. M H King
Co., 142 Idaho 383; 128 P.3d 920, 922 (2005). Anything less is inherently arbitrary and
capricious.
111.

THE RESPONDENT BOCC IS BARRED BY THE QUASI-ESTOPPEL BRANCH
OF THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE FROM VIOLATING ITS POSTARBITRATION AGREEMENT WITH APPELLANT, KHD.
Intervenors' brief fails to discuss the estoppel issues raised by KI-ID before the BOCC, the

district court and in the KHD opening brief on appeal, thus conceding those issues to Appellant.
The Respondent County brief mistakenly asserts at page 31, that as a matter of law ICHD could
not meet any of the elements of equitable estoppel, which respondent asserts, in contradiction to
the clear law of quasi-estoppel, requires: (1) a false representation of a material fact; (2) that the
party asserting the estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) the false
representation was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) the person to whom the
false representation was made, relied and acted upon the representation to its prejudice, citing

Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,22,644 P. 2d 341,344 (1982),
ignoring the Christiansen v. City ofPocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 124 P. 3d 1008 (2005) holding that
quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel are part and parcel of the same doctrine; and that there is
no need to show detrimental reliance, Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P. 3d 310 (2006); nor
any misrepresentation of fact or detrimental reliance ia establishing quasi-estoppel. C & G, Inc.
v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 145, 75 P. 3d 194,198 (2003) ("quasi-

estoppel applies when (1) the offending party took a different position than its original position,
and (2) either the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other

In Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807; 186 P. 2d 663 (2008), this Court laid out the doctrine in
full: "This doctrine applies when: (I) the offending party took a different position than his or her
original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or (c) it
would he unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from
one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. C & G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 145, 75
P.3d at 199." Allen, 145 Idaho at 812, 186 P.3d at 668.
In the 27 years since Twin Falls was decided, this Court has decided nine (9) cases that
establishes that the quasi-estoppel branch of the equitable estoppel doctrine, as set out in the
ICHD opening brief, is not founded upon a false representation, does not require reliance or
prejudice and is not based on failure to discover the tmth.' As held in Atwood v. Smith, 143
Idaho 110; 138 P. 3d 310 (2006):
"The doctrine of quasi-estoppel prevents a party from asserting a right, to the
detriment of another party, which is inconsiste~itwith a position previously
taken." Atwood, 143 Idaho at 114, 138 P.3d at 314.
In amplifying the inconsistent position test, Bivdwood Subdivision HOA v. Bulotti

Construction, Inc, 145 Idaho 17; 175 P. 3d 179 (2007) held that there is no need to show
any false misrepresentation, nor detrimental reliance, but there may he alternative
evidence to show that it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to assert
contradictory positions, citing Atwood at 115. The present situation perfectly meets all of
the alternative inconsistent position, detrimental reliance and unconscionahility tests. At

'

Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807,186 P. 3d 663 (2008); Wynn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 184 P. 3d 852 (2008);
Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P. 3d 731 (2005); In Re Estate ofElliott, 141 Idaho 177, 108 P.3d 324
(2005); Christiansen v. City of Pocatello, 142 ldaho 132, 124 P. 3d 1008 (2005); Birdwood Subdivision HOA, Inc.
v. Bulotti Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 175 P. 3d 179 (2007); Sorensen v. Saint Alphol~susRegional Medical
Center, Inc., 141 ldaho 754, 118 P. 3d 86 (2005); C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140,75
P. 3d 194 (2003); and Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho, 110, 138 P. 3d 310 (2006).

great cost, KHD prepared a revised application, abated its first appeal, made
commitmellts to build a fire house, a bridge over Highway 97, and other mitigation, and
entered into the Post-Mediation Agreement which stipulated the specific issues that
would be considered at the second hearing, only to find that the BOCC had completely
repudiated its publicly adopted agreement and sandbagged ICHD with whole new
compreheilsive plan goal issues at the second hearing which the BOCC had found KHD
to be in compliance with at the first hearing. Moreover, in raising these new
comprehensive plan goals, the BOCC contradicted its position at the first hearing, the
findings and conclusions and recommendation of the ,Hearing Examiner (which requires
stricter scrutiny by the courts) and perhaps most importantly, repudiated the public policy
of the judiciary to consider seriously the provisions of mediation agreements reached in
settlement of litigation. Of all of the nine cases decided by this Court on quasi-estoppel,
this case is the most compelling.
The position taken by Respondent at page 30 of Respondent's brief that
enforcement of estoppel in this situation would compromise the police power of the
County rings false. There is no binding contract on the part of the County to adopt the
planned development approval, to evade a second hearing on the application or to spot
zone the property. The Post Mediation Agreement provided only that certain issues
would be entertained at the hearing since the first hearing and the subsequent mitigation
actions of KHD had disposed of the remaining issues. This case does not involve an
impairment of the County's police power at all.
In deciding quasi-judicial functions the County is not exercising regulatory police
power. Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 128 Idaho 609,

25

917 P. 2d 766 (1996) (regulatory bodies performing legislative functions are not
rigorously bound by administrative doctrines of stare decisis, but are so bound when
exercising judicial functions); Washington Water Power Company v. Idaho Public

Utilities Commission, 101 Idaho 567, 617 P. 2d 1242 (1980) (regulatory action is
distinguishable from applying established law or

to past facts in quasi-judicial

function).
In an identical situation the California Court of Appeals upheld a mediation
settlement agreement which fixed the issues to be considered at a subsequent county
public hearing on a discretionary approval against the arguments of neighboring
interveners that the County had bargained away its police power or proscribed the
statutory hearing process. Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v.County of Sun Luis
" 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 (2000). For a full analysis of court
Obispo, 84 ~ a l . ~ p p . 4221,
decisions rejecting the bargaining away of the police power argument, see David L.
Callies, Robert H. Freilich and Thomas E. Roberts, Cases and Materials on Land Use,
Development Agreements, 168-182 (5'" ed. West, 2008).
The Idaho Supreme Court decisions also reject the assertion made by Respondent at
page 29 of its brief, citing a 1973 case, Harrell v. City oflewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.
2d 741 (1973), asserting that estoppel does not apply to governmental entities. In C & G,

Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P. 3d 194 (2003) and
Christiansen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 124 P. 3d 1008 (2005).

Estoppel theories present mixed questions of law and fact. The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac,
130 Idaho 67, 69; 936 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1997) (citations omitted). Because mixed questions of
law and fact are primarily questions of law, this Court exercises free review. Id
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has two branches: "estoppel in pais and equitable estoppel,
which is based on the equitable principle that a person with full knowledge of the facts shall not
be permitted to act in a manner inconsistent with his or her former position or conduct to the
injury of anotl~er." Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 70, 74; 867 P.2d 920, 948 (1992). Yet
Respondent in its brief relies solely on the law surrounding equitable estoppel as its defense,
even though KHD's opening brief shows that its position on equitable estoppel is wrong under
Idaho law. Respondent, however, has totally missed the controlling law of quasi-estoppel. See

Campbell v. Kildau, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731 (2005) (distinguishing quasi-estoppel from
equitable estoppel).
Respondent is reduced to mere sophistry in arguing against estoppel. It concedes from
one side of its mouth that the Post-Mediation Agreement was a contract and that the County was
bound by Idaho law to fulfill its contractual obligations; from the other side it argues that there
was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel:
"prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which is
inconsistent with a position previously taken." C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway
Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). This doctrine applies
when: (1) the offending party toolc a different position than his or her original
position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to
maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit
or acquiesced in. Id. at 145, 75 P. 3d at 199; Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc.,
137 Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002)." To prove quasi-estoppel, it is
not necessary to show detrimental reliance; instead, there inust be evidence that it
would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to assert allegedly
contrary positions. Thomas, 137 at 357, 48 P.3d at 1246." Atwood v. Smith 143
Idaho 110,114; 138 P.3d 310,314 (2006).

Respondent's argument that the post-mediation application constituted an entirely new
application process and that despite the very clear language of the Post-Mediation Agreement,
Respondent was under no obligation to fulfill its contractual obligation is sheer nonsense.
Notwithstanding Respondent's attempts at obfuscation, the Mediation Agreement could not be
clearer. The Agreement sets forth at Paragraph 2 that "[tlhe Board and KHD agreed to and
hereby identify the actions that applicant KHD can tale to obtain a permitiapproval of the PUD."
Not some of the actions applicant can take, but the actions that will obtain approval of the PUD.
It then identifies, in subsections A, B and C, those certain actions - building sites to comply with
all laws, including those for building on slopes; any disturbance of wetlands to comply with all
laws; and KHD to mitigate the effect of the development on Highway 97 - required of ICHD. In
Paragraph 3, the Agreement expedites the hearing schedule so that KI-ID can comply with the
requiremeilts and move forward.
The Post-Mediation Agreement gave both parties something they wanted. Respondent
got agreements from KHD to address the County's concerns regarding building on slopes,
wetlands and traffic conditions on Highway 97 - the very issues it based its initial denial upon.
KHD got an expedited process that would allow it to move forward with its project. "The
doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to
maintain a position inconsistent with the one in which he or she acquiesced, or of which he or
she accepted a benefit." In re Estate of Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 183, 108 P.3d 324, 330 (2005).
The County received the benefit of its Post-Mediation Agreement. The District Court case was
suspended and the County was saved considerable time and expense in not having to litigate. On
the other hand, KHD spent considerable time and money in altering its plans to fulfill the
County's stated objections. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel clearly applies in this instance.

Moreover, the Agreement specifically references Idaho Code $67-6519(4)(c), which
couldn't be clearer:
"Whenever a governing board or zoning or planning and zoning cominission
grants or denies a permit, it shall specify: . . .
(c) The actions, if any, that the applicant could talce to obtain a permit."
The purpose of I.C. $67-6519(4)(c) is to provide transparency in the planning process and to
permit developers the opportunity to malce revisions that will permit them to move forward.
KHD does not have to start from scratch and the BOCC does not get a new bite of the apple. If
KHD did not meet the terms of the Mediation Agreement, the BOCC could deny the permit. The
corollary was that upon meeting the terms of the Agreement, KHD would accomplish the
requirements of the conceptual stage and would be allowed to go to the next stage. Contrary to
the Respondent's argument, the hearings would not be a sham because the opportunity for public
hearings to raise objections had already occurred. The public had raised its objections, and the
BOCC had denied the application - that is why the case went to the District Court, and why there
had been a mediation and a mediation agreement - the second round of expedited hearings were
to follow up on KHD's fulfillment of its contractual obligation under the agreement.
ICHD had an absolute right, as a matter of law, to bring a new application; it didn't need
an agreement for that. Following Respondent's argument to its logical conclusion, there would
be no point whatsoever to this, or any, mediation agreement with the County if all it means is
that the County gets not just a new bite of the apple, but a whole new apple!
Not only did Respondent violate the Mediation Agreement, its legal argument appears to
be that LC. $67-6519(4)(c) is meaningless, that Respondent may identify some actions an
applicant can take, but reserves the right to come up with other actions not previously identified.
In other words, the Respondent argues the entire application process can be turned into a shell

game where the Respondent gets to simply keep moving the target! Could anything be more
arbitrary and capricious? This claimed ability of the County to play shell games is exactly why
Respondent is estopped from bringing up new reasons for denying KHD's application.

IV.

ADMINISTRATIVE FINALITY, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES
JUDICATA PREVENT RESPONDENT FROM TAKING A NEW BITE OF THE
APPLE IN THE SECOND HEARING.
The doctrine of issue and claim preclusion, or res judicata, applies to administrative

decisions. Madsen v. Idaho Depavtnzent of Tvansportation, 115 Idaho 1132, 722 P. 2d 1226
(1989); Blackbuvn v. Olson, 69 Idaho 428,433, 207 P.2d 1160, 1163-64 (1949); Pence v. Idaho
State Hovse Racing Comm'n, 109 Idaho 112, 115,705 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Id. App. 1985).
The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindmavsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92,94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002).
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upoii the same claim or upon
claims "relating to the sane cause of action . . . which might have been made." Id. Issue
preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy.
Rodviguez v. Dep't ofCovv., 136 Idaho 90,92,29 P.3d 401,403 (2001).
Separate tests are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies.
See D.A.R., Inc. v. Sheffev, 134 Idaho 141, 144,997 P.2d 602,605 (2000). Indeed in Ticor Title
Company v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119,123; 157 P. 3d 613, 617 (2007), the court held that res
judicata: (1) serves to prevent corrosive disrespect which would follow if the same matter were
twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) serves the public interest in protecting the courts
against the burden of repetitive claims; and advances (3) the private interest in repose from
the harassment of repetitive claims, citing Hindmavsh at 98. That is exactly the situation we

have in this case with the repetitive harassment of KHD and the inconsistent positions taken by
the BOCC.
A. Issue Preclusion.

Issue preclusion protects litigants froin having to relitigate an identical issue in a
subsequent action. Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 92; 29 P.3d at 403. Five factors are required in order
for issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding:
"(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior
litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the
merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or
in privity with a party to the litigation." Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 93, 29 P.3d at 404.
In the present instance, the administrative process was complete. The County Planning
Staff had been intimately involved in the matter throughout and the hearings before the Hearing
Examiner and then before the BOCC gave the public ample opportunity to raise any and all
issues.

At the conclusion of the first set of hearings, the BOCC concluded that KHD's

application failed to fulfill only two comprehensive plan goals - goals 7 (prevent or limit
development activity in hazardous areas) and 14 (provide for the efficient, safe and cost-effective
movement of people and goods) - which were specifically addressed and mitigated in the PostMediation Agreement.
The doctrine of res judicata applies to all questions which might have been raised as well
to all questions which were raised in the original agreement. In Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho
774, 777, 186 P. 3d 630 (2008) this Court held:

"

As we said in Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241,

242-43 (1922), "[Tlhe former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every
matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to every matter which

might and should have been litigated in the first suit." The prior adjudication "extinguishes
ail claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of
action arose." Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150; 804 P.2d 3 19, 323 (1990)
(Emphasis added).
At the time of the second hearing, the BOCC unilaterally reopened seven (7)
comprehensive goal issues, concluding, despite its earlier findings, the findings of the Hearing
Examiner, the Planning Department and the Post-Mediation Agreement, that the application
fulfilled goals 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 23 and 24. The County was precluded from making new findings
with regard to (1) the goals it had concluded at the first hearings, had been satisfied; and (2) the
goals it had previously had the opportunity to address.

B. Claim Preclusion.
For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) same
parties; (2) same claim or transaction; and (3) final judgment. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho 92 at 94;
57 P.3d at 805; Farmers Nut? Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994). In

Andrus, 145 Idaho at 777, this Court held that
"The determination of whether a group of facts constitutes a "transaction" is to be
made "pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties'
expectations or business understandiilg or usage." Restatement (Second) of
Judgments $24 (1982). A cause of action can be barred by a prior
adjudication even though the theory of liability and supporting evidence
differ from the cause of action actually litigated in the prior lawsuit. Magic

Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434,437-39,849 P.2d 107, 110-112
(19931."
"The doctrine of claim preclusion extends to the decisions of administrative agencies."

Pence v. Idaho State Horse Racing Cornrn'n, 109 Idaho 112, 707 P.2d 1067 (Idaho App. 1985).
There can be no dispute but that the same parties and the same matter were brought before the
County in a quasi-judicial hearing and that the sane facts and circumstances applied to the
second hearing. The County was therefore barred from re-litigating the issues that had been
decided at the time of the first hearing and of raising new issues that it had the opportunity to
raise, but failed to do so.

V.

AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S PEES TO KHD IS CLEARLY APPROPRIATE
IN THIS INSTANCE, WHERE RESPONDENT ACTED WITIlOUT A
REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR IN LAW.
It has long been the law in Idaho that attorney's fees may properly be awarded against a

city or county. Averitt v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 100 Idaho 751; 605 P.2d 515, 516 (1980).
"Idaho Code $12-117(1) states that: In any administrative or civil judicial
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law. I.C. $12-117(1) (2004). This Court has held that the purpose of this
statute is "two-fold: '(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency
action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting
to correct mistakes agencies never should have made." Rincovev v. State, Dep't of
Fin., Secs. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 549; 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999) (quoting
Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854,859; 693 P.2d 1056,
1061 (1984)). If the Court determines that a party acted without a reasonable basis
in fact or law, an award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-117 is mandatory."
Rincovev v. State, Dep't of Fin., Secs. Bureau, ,132 Idaho 547, 549; 976 P.2d 473,
475 (1999). (Emphasis added.)

Respondent, at page 41 of its brief, has the temerity to suggest attorney's fees should not
be awarded because the Court is aslced to interpret a statute for the first time within the context of
the facts of this case. Respondent does not mention how the facts here are "novel, nor what
statute it believes the Court will be interpreting for the first time.
The reality of the situation is that the County has, throughout this process, acted without a
reasonable basis in fact and law and in utter disregard for its quasi-judicial responsibilities. The
law here is clear. It is undisputed that the BOCC is required to act in a quasi-judicial capacity
when it considers whether to approve or deny applications for subdivisions and PUDs. "A
decision by a zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to specific individuals,
interests or situations, are quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process constraints."
Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd of Comm'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 118 (1994) (applying zoning
rules to specific applications is quasi-judicial); Cowan v. Bd, of Comrn 'rs of Fremont County,
143 Idaho 501 (2006); Cooper v. Board of County Comm'vs ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407,411
(1980). Neither the BOCC, nor any individual Commissioner, is allowed to advocate approval
or denial of the application. "When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter the governing
board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but sits instead in the seat
of a judge." Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846
(2007). Instead, the BOCC has ignored competent scientific evidence in favor of emotional lay
argument and prognostication as to hypothetical future applications for building permits; has
violated KHD's due process rights with un-noticed amateur traffic studies; has ignored its own
specific zoning ordinance in favor of generic coinprehensive plan concepts; has violated its PostMediation Agreement with KHD and has violated the basic precepts of res judicata, and has

made decisions based on political climate - all to satisfy the public's anti-development
sentiment.
In addition, the County in direct contradiction to the issues that were limited to be heard
in the second BOCC hearing by the Post-Mediation Agreement, violated quasi-estoppel and
administrative res judicata, claim and issue preclusion as a question of law and fact. Res
Judicata is clearly applicable to administrative decisions under Idaho law. Idaho State Bar v.

Everard, 142 Idaho 109, 124 P. 3d 985 (2005); Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Water
Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 70 P. 3d 669 (2003); J&J Contractors v. State by Idaho
Transportation Board, 118 Idaho 535,792 P.2d 1383 (1990).
Under these circumstances, attorney's fees are properly awarded. In the recent case of C

Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 562, 563, 181 P.3d 485 (2008) this Court stated:
"In addition, in an action.. .[where]...every matter which might and should have
been litigated in the first suit, the C Systems claims were clearly barred by res
judicata and we award costs and attorney's fees to McGee.", citing Andrus v.
Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 186 P. 3d 630 (2008); Joyce v. Murphy, 35 Idaho 549;
208 P. 241,242-243 (1922).
As the Court set forth in Rincover, supra, an order of attorney's fees in favor of KHD is
mandatory.

VI.

CONCLUSION
Whereas conclusively shown in KHD's opening and this reply brief, this Court should

reverse the decision of the District Court and remand for further proceedings to the Board of
County Cominissioners of Kootenai County, with instructions to approve, or at the minimum
rehear, the KHD applications for planned development and subdivision approval on the basis that
the decision of the Board denying such applications was: made upon unlawful procedures;
35

affected by error of law with respect to the application of the doctrines of quasi-estoppel, res
judicata and issue preclusion; clearly erroneous in view of substantial evidence in the record as a
whole; a violation of the constitutional right to procedural and substantive due process; is
arbitrary and capricious and constitutes an abuse of administrative and quasi-judicial discretion.
Knight v. New Mexico Department of Insurance, 124.Idaho 645; 862 P.2d 337 (Id. App. 1993).
Where the principles of quasi and equitable estoppel, and issue preclusion govern the
proceeding, it is right and proper for this Court to reverse and remand to the district court to enter
a final order and judgment declaring that the planned development and subdivision approvals be
granted and that the district court remand to Kootenai Couilty for processing the final ministerial
approvals for the project.
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